The Boss

Commander of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron, Zinovi Petrovich Rhozdestvensky. Likely this photo was taken after Tsushima as his beard has been trimmed. Contemporary photos show him with a long white beard, as befitting a Tsarist senior military officer.

Rhozdestvensky's early career was blighted. Allegedly, he invented a battle with a Turkish gunboat, which he claimed to have sunk. Later research proved no such battle took place.

He was gunnery specialist and commander of the Baltic Fleet in 1904.

There's no doubt he was a hard driver with a blistering temper. He had no problem firing a live round across the bows of any of his command who displeased him. He was prone to episodes of despair, however, and who could blame him? He'd shut himself away for days on end - particularly at Nossi Be where the fleet paused on its journey around the world.

He was given almost an impossible set of orders - to sail the Baltic Fleet around the world and beat the Japanese. It was a bold move by the Russians, but also displayed breathtaking arrogance.

The Tsar constantly referred to the Japanese as 'little yellow monkeys' who needed to be 'tamed.' The Russo-Japanese War was going to be a 'short victorious war' to divert Russia from its problems. Proconsul in the Far East, Alexiev, was a champagne diplomat and vacillator but Russia's most experienced military commander, Kuropatkin, described the war as 'folly.' He should have been listened to.

Russian Intelligence wildly underestimated both the size and efficiency of the Japanese armed forces. They took no heed of the circumstances of the Japanese defeat of the Chinese in 1894. The Japanese attacked without a formal declaration of war - an obvious lesson. Port Arthur was virtually undefended while Russia poured millions into the civilian port of Dalny - a strategic mistake.

After Port Arthur's loss, Rhozdestvensky should have been recalled or his fleet made to wait at Cam Ranh Bay. But the Admiral was being pushed on by an Admiralty living in a fantasy. The Tsar needed a victory, no matter how unlikely that was going to be.

The decision to encumber the Admiral with Nebogatov's third squadron showed the Russian autocracy was dominated by military thinking, not naval. Increasing numbers by swelling your fleet with old and obsolete hulls might make some military sense but was a crazy idea at sea. Inferior troops could be left to hold a strong position while your elite units used in maneuvre. No such option exists in a naval battle. Your slowest ships set the speed of the fleet - and Rhozdestvensky was held to 9 knots by his auto sinkers and transports. That handed Togo the freedom to maneuvre.

Rhozdestvensky was criticised for steering his first division across the bows of the second to get at Togo's point of turn. In hindsight, it was the best chance he had of damaging the Japanese. With Suvorov disabled and the Admiral unconscious, it was all over after 15 minutes and it was his subordinates who tried to recover the situation.

After the debacle, Rhozdventsky, now in poor health with a scrap of iron in his head, fiercely defended Nebogatov and those of his captains who surrendered. Risking the firing squad himself, he took all the responsibility upon himself and ultimately influenced the Tsar to get them released. He died soon after in 1909.

Don