Paradigms

An example of paradigm shift I've seen quoted many times goes like this - 'In the 1920s, a US battlefleet was on nighttime maneuvres when the watch on the bridge of the flagship noticed a light dead ahead. The Captain orders a signal sent for the errant vessel to move out the way.

"You turn," came the terse reply.

The Admiral duly ascended to the bridge and, outraged, ordered another signal sent.

"I'm a battle squadron of the US Navy and you will get out of my way. Turn away now!"

A reply promptly arrived. "I'm a lighthouse. I suggest you turn."

The battle squadron turned.'

I've read some learned dissertations on whether it was a true story or not. My feeling is that it's not, for several reasons.

A lighthouse should be obvious. Its light revolves - ergo, flashes. Ships don't emit flashing lights unless they are signaling. To attain the rank of Admiral, or even Captain, would suggest a basic mastering of the art of navigation. It stretches the imagination that an Admiral would steer his fleet towards foul water, even at night, even in the 1920s. Likely he would not be an Admiral for long. Watches are kept and, even at night, the simple art of dead reckoning using charts would give the crew a reasonable idea of where they were and if there was any danger. Titanic bumped an iceberg, sure, but they knew where they were (even if they didn't know there was an iceberg there. In any case, few icebergs have a lighthouse attached to them.)

Admirals and Captains do have moments of faulty inspiration. In the 19th Century, HMS Camperdown rammed HMS Victoria at Alexandria while trying to impress the Egyptians with the might and superior training of the Royal Navy. The Victoria was sunk with high loss of life. British sailors in those days rarely learned to swim. Steel battleships weren't supposed to sink, in any case, particularly by ones own side.

The maneuvre wasn't in the textbook and the Admiral hadn't allowed sufficient distance between ships - clearly. Some worthies have suggested that Camperdown's bow ram was the culprit and Victoria wouldn't have sunk if not for this protuberance. Maybe, but neither would've it been sunk if it hadn't been hit in the first place.

In 1905, Rozhdestventsky's Russian flagship, Suvorov, put a salvo into its own escorting cruiser, Aurora, while in the act of pounding the British, Hull fishing fleet. Why the Russian Navy was engaging a fishing fleet, and British at that, is another story. But Aurora survived - to signal the start of the Russian revolution in 1917. Aurora's fire crews were exemplary and the blaze was put out, but, it has to be said, they had a lot of practice. Rozhdestventsky's gunners also fired live rounds at their own Kamchatka - which was supposed to be towing the target - and blew in the after deckhouse. Target towing must have become the least sort after duty in the Russian navy at that time.

But Aurora's dilemma was in the midst of a battle - even if the 'enemy' were fishing boats and, likely, they weren't shooting back. There was enough wildly aimed Russian ordinance flying around anyway to make it seem like a 'real' battle. Mistakes happen in the heat, as it were, when lives are at stake. Mistakes happen during training - that's the point - but measures can be taken to ensure the result isn't fatal. People panic in action and make mistakes sometimes. I understand that.

But, hapless, undertrained and under-motivated as many of Admiral Rozhdestventsky's crews were, they never steered the Russian Second Pacific Fleet onto rocks, despite sailing all the way from the Baltic to the sea of Japan. After the battle of Tsushima, some individual ships drove onto rocks. but some did so deliberately to save the crews. The Cruiser Izumrud ran onto rocks while trying to escape along the coast of Korea, but then, it was taking risks to evade enemy warships.

So my point is - I think - if the Russians didn't ground their fleet in 1905, I doubt the Americans risked their fleet like that in the 1920s.